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resumo Este artigo argumenta que a resposta de Crisipo à objeção segundo a qual o Destino 
é incompatível com o fato de algo estar em nosso poder (e, portanto, com a justiça de 
honras e punições) consiste em uma correção daquilo que se entende por estar em nosso 
poder (de uma noção em termos de originação última para uma noção em termos de cau-
sação autossuficiente) e, pois, em uma correção igualmente daquilo que se entende por 
justiça em honras e punições (de uma noção em termos retributivos para uma noção em 
termos reabilitativos).
palavras-chave Crisipo; “aquilo que está em nosso poder” (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν); causas; punição; 
retribuição; reabilitação
My aim in this paper is to discuss Chrysippus’ reply to the objection that 
Fate does away with justice in honor and punishments in Cicero, Fat. 41-
3. In particular, I want to stress that Chrysippus’ reply involves a shift from 
retributive to rehabilitative justice, visible on the different meanings assigned 
to the Latin esse (situ) in nobis/esse in nostra potestate (correspondent to the 
Greek ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι) in the objection and in Chrysippus’ reply. In my view, 
the discussion reported by Cicero concerning “that which is up to us” and 
justice in honor and punishments is continuous with, and complements, 
the discussion concerning παρ’ ἡμᾶς γίνεσθαι and effectiveness in (praise 
and blame qua) exhortations reported by Diogenianus (apud Eusebius, 
Praep. Ev. VI 8). I begin with a few words on the latter.2 
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I
In Eusebius, Praep. Ev. VI 8 1-2 and 25, Diogenianus reports that Chrysippus, 
in Book I of his work On Fate, attempted to show that everything is 
subsumed under Necessity and Fate (τὸ … πάνθ᾿ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς 
εἱμαρμένης κατειλῆφθαι, 1), whereas in Book II of the same work he tried 
to solve the many absurdities that are taken to follow from that thesis and 
establish that many things also depend on us (τὸ καὶ παρ’ ἡμᾶς πολλὰ γίνεσθαι, 
2).3 A close inspection of Diogenianus’ testimony in sections 26-38 shows 
that two strata should there be distinguished: Chrysippus’ reply (from 
Book II of his work On Fate) to an objection leveled against his theory 
of Fate (in sections 26-9 and parts of sections 33-4, clearly demarcated by 
the use of φησίν, “he [=Chrysippus] says”), and Diogenianus’ own (further) 
objection to Chrysippus’ reply to the original objection (in the remaining 
portions of sections 26-38: cf. οἶμαι, “I [=Diogenianus] think,” 30; εἴποιμ’ 
ἄν, “I [=Diogenianus] would say,” 33).
The original objection addressed by Chrysippus in the testimony is 
never explicitly formulated in the text. All we have is a statement to the 
effect that from the fact that everything takes place according to Fate it 
supposedly follows “the suppression … of the eagerness that proceeds 
from our own selves and concerns praise, blame, and exhortation, and 
of everything that manifestly depends on our causation for its taking 
place” (τὸ ἀναιρεῖσθαι … τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ 
ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπὰς καὶ πανθ’ ὅσα παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν γιγνόμενα 
φαίνεται, 25).
The use of προθυμία (or its cognate verb προθυμεῖσθαι), ἐξ ἡμῶν 
αὐτῶν, and παρά + acc. in the sense of “dependent on”/”brought about 
by” in connection with the issue of exhortation (προτροπή) seems to 
me reminiscent of the digression in Book XXV of Epicurus’ work On 
Nature (esp. LS 20C10-11), where it is stated that Epicurus’ opponent 
will not alter any of our actions (ἔργον … οὐθὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει) as the 
person who regularly dissuades (εἴωθε ἀποτρέπειν) those who are eager 
(προθυμουμένους) to do something (πράττειν τι) brought about by force 
(παρὰ βίαν, i.e., presumably, not παρ’ ἡμᾶς); and that [if everything takes 
place by Fate] one will inquire what sort of action proceeds somehow 
from our own selves (ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πως πραττόμενον) but without our 
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being eager to (μὴ προθυμουμένων πράττειν) [or, following the text in 
Laursen (1997), through eagerness (τῇ προθυμίᾳ τοῦ πράττειν)].
As for the second part of the passage, either (following Sedley’s text) it 
makes no sense to say of a class of fated actions that they proceed somehow 
from our own selves but without our being eager to because the same 
would be true of all fated actions, or (following Laursen’s text) there is no 
fated action such that it proceeds somehow from our own selves through 
eagerness; either way, Epicurus may be here read as asserting that Fate 
suppresses τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν. As for the first part of the passage, 
since (allegedly) nothing takes place παρ’ ἡμᾶς but everything takes place 
παρὰ βίαν if everything takes place by Fate, there is no point in trying to 
dissuade one from doing something and in trying to alter one’s action.
More explicitly, a little earlier on in the digression (LS 20C2) the 
practices of admonishing (νουθετεῖν), opposing (μάχεσθαι), and reforming 
(μεταρυθμίζειν) one another are invoked against Epicurus’ opponent. Once 
again, Epicurus may be here read as asserting that Fate would render us 
incapable of making a difference as regards future courses of events: all 
our efforts would be pointless and futile given the fixity of what shall 
come to pass.
That, of course, is false. To say that an event is fated is not to say that it will 
take place regardless and that we do not have a hand in making it the case. 
Nevertheless, Epicurus’ text does allow for such reading,4 which would 
in turn entail that there is no point in admonishing, opposing, attempting 
to reform or even dissuade a person from a given course of action—
apparently, the same idea behind the original objection against Chrysippus’ 
theory of Fate in Diogenianus, i.e. that genuine openness is required in 
order for praise and blame to play an effective role as exhortations.
Chrysippus is therefore certainly right in claiming that an outcome’s 
being fated along with our decisions and actions (i.e. its being fated only 
if our decisions and actions are themselves fated to take place as well) 
is sufficient for such outcome to proceed from us in the relevant sense 
(Praep. Ev. VI 8 26-9, 34), so that that which depends on us (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς) 
is after all subsumed under Fate (33): if one’s decisions and actions are 
effective in influencing the course of events and in bringing about a given 
outcome, then it makes sense to (praise or blame a person in order to) 
exhort her to produce that outcome.
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One may claim, however, that while under Fate praise and blame do 
have a point as exhortations, they are nevertheless not deserved by the 
agents, since that requires ultimate origination, i.e. the fact that we author 
our decisions and actions, which in turn requires that they be insufficiently 
caused by previous events outside our control, so as to assure us genuine 
openness to decide and act thus or otherwise. 
Chrysippus must then attempt to prove that determinism is compatible 
with justice in honor and punishments—his task being all the more 
pressing since the incompatibilist might still claim that on her analysis 
both effectiveness in (praise and blame qua) exhortations and justice in 
honor and punishments are accounted for. In fact, while it is false to say 
that the fact that a misfortune shall take place unless we guard ourselves 
against it entails that it is up to us (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) to guard or not to guard 
ourselves against it (as Diogenianus claims in Eusebius, Praep. Ev. IV 3 10), 
the incompatibilist might still (correctly) claim that the same openness 
that guarantees the latter also guarantees the former—which is exactly 
what one finds in Sextus, M V 46-8 (a passage of possible Epicurean 
provenance, in light of the tripartition κατ’ ἀνάγκην, κατὰ τύχην, παρ’ ἡμᾶς: 
cf. DL X 133), where it is sufficient for an event to take place παρ’ ἡμᾶς 
that it be “that whose taking place or not is up to me, i.e. that which does 
not have from its inception a preceding cause” (τὸ ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ κείμενον ἐκβῆναι 
ἢ μή, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ἀρχῆθεν προκαταβεβλημένην αἰτίαν, 48).
This difficulty (and Chrysippus’ reply) is what one finds in Cicero, Fat. 
40-3. There, the objection addressed by Chrysippus sets out to show that, 
if everything takes place by Fate, then we are not the ultimate origin or 
first cause of our assents and actions, which has in turn the consequence 
that our assents and actions are not up to us, so that praise and blame, as 
well as honor and punishment, for them are not deserved. 
II
Two strata should be distinguished in Cicero, Fat. 39-45: one composed 
of (what appears to be) translated quotations and paraphrases, containing 
both the original objection and Chrysippus’ reply (fully reproduced in 
what follows); the other consisting of a third-party assessment of the 
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debate, concerned with the issue of modality, and corresponding to §§39 
and 44-5, along with a few sentences in the respective openings of §§40, 
41, and 42 (omitted below). The connection between Fate and necessity 
is explicitly made only in the (apparently later) framework, not in the 
original objection and reply—in fact, if my reading of §§40-3 (as well as 
of §§7-11: below, IV (i)) is correct, it is not even required at this juncture. 
I therefore disagree with Bobzien (1998a: 255-6) when she says that what 
is under attack in the objection is the claim that our assents’ being fated 
does not entail their being necessary. Instead, I think the original objection 
is primarily concerned with Fate’s precluding ultimate origination, while 
the (alleged) incompatibility between Fate and our actions’ not being 
necessary constitutes a different objection—of which Plutarch, St. Rep. 
46 may also be regarded as a testimony.
The original objection is presented as follows:
“Si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente, et, si adpetitus, illa 
etiam, quae adpetitum sequuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones; at, si causa 
adpetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem adpetitus est in nostra 
potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem, quae adpetitu efficiuntur, 
sunt sita in nobis; non sunt igitur neque adsensiones neque actiones 
in nostra potestate. Ex quo efficitur, ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec 
vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia.” Quod cum vitiosum sit, 
probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri, quaecumque fiant.
“If all things come about by fate, all things come about by an antecedent 
cause; and if impulses do, so too do those things which follow on 
impulse; and therefore so too do assentings. But if the cause of impulse 
is not up to us, impulse itself too is not in our power; and if this is so, 
neither are those things which are brought about by impulse up to 
us. So neither assentings nor actions are in our power; and from this 
it follows that neither praise nor blame nor honors nor punishments 
are just.” But since this is wrong, they think that the conclusion can 
reasonably be drawn that it is not the case that all things that come 
about do so by fate [Fat. 40; trans. Sharples, slightly altered].
Before we proceed, two issues must be clarified. First, the Latin phrases 
esse (situ) in nobis (“to be up to us”) and esse in nostra potestate (“to be in our 
power”) are used interchangeably in the passage, and seem to correspond 
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to the Greek phrase ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι. Second, the argument appears to rely on 
Stoic psychology of action as exposed, e.g., in Seneca, Ep. 113 18:
Omne rationale animal nihil agit nisi primum specie alicuius rei 
inritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc 
impetum.
Every rational animal remains inactive unless it is first stirred by the 
impression of something; then comes impulse; then assent confirms that 
impulse.
Cicero’s adpetitus appears thus to correspond to Seneca’s impetus, and to 
stand for unconfirmed impulse. (Or, alternatively, Cicero’s adpetitus may 
stand for the (impulsive) impression itself, which would then be followed 
by assent; either way, what is here termed “impulse” non-standardly 
precedes rather than follows assent.)
Matters being such, let us now turn to the argument. The first 
assumption is,
[1] If everything takes place by Fate, then everything takes place by an 
antecedent cause (si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente), 
which follows from Stoic view on Fate as the chain of causes. The second 
assumption is never enunciated in general terms in Cicero’s report, but 
may be formulated as follows on the basis of its two instantiations in the 
sequence (namely, “If the cause of ‘impulse’ is not up to us, then neither 
is ‘impulse’ itself in our power,” si causa adpetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse 
quidem adpetitus est in nostra potestate; and “If this is so [i.e., if ‘impulse’ itself 
is not in our power], then neither are those things up to us which are 
caused by ‘impulse,’” quod si ita est, ne illa quidem, quae adpetitu efficiuntur, 
sunt sita in nobis): 
<[2] If the cause of x is not in our power, then x is not in our power 
either.>
For something to be up to us is, I think, here to be understood in terms of 
our being its ultimate origin or first cause (see above, p.6 on Sextus, M V 
48), which then explains the stress on anteceding causes in the argument. 
This being so, it should be clear that the consequent in [1]5 entails the 
antecedent in [2].
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Two further assumptions are needed:
<[3] If our assents and actions are not in our power, then praise and 
blame, as well as honor and punishment, [for them] are not just,>
and
<[4] Praise and blame, as well as honor and punishment, are just.>
These may easily be gathered from the text, but are never presented in so 
many words. Since, then, the antecedent in [3] is but an instantiation of 
the consequent in [2], it follows, on the basis of the assumptions, that it is 
not the case that everything takes place by Fate.6 
The central step is to understand something’s being up to us in terms 
of ultimate origination. Correspondingly, Chrysippus’ reply consists in 
a distinction between types of causes (or, rather, between schemes of 
causation) according to which [2] is not valid for preceding causes, only 
for self-sufficient ones:
“Causarum enim,” inquit, “aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae 
adiuvantes et proximae. Quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri 
causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus: causis perfectis et 
principalibus, sed causis adiuvantibus [antecedentibus] et proximis.” 
Itaque illi rationi, quam paulo ante conclusi, sic occurrit: si omnia fato 
fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis fiant antepositis, verum non 
principalibus causis et perfectis, sed adiuvantibus et proximis. Quae 
si ipsae non sunt in nostra potestate, non sequitur, ut ne adpetitus 
quidem sit in nostra potestate. At hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et 
principalibus causis fieri diceremus, ut, cum eae causae non essent in 
nostra potestate, ne ille quidem esset in nostra potestate.
“For,” he said, “some causes are perfect and primary, others auxiliary 
and proximate; and for this reason, when we say that everything comes 
about by fate through antecedent causes, we do not want this to be 
understood as ‘through perfect and primary causes,’ but as ‘through 
auxiliary and proximate causes.’” And so he meets the argument, which 
I set out a short while ago, as follows. If all things come about by fate, 
it does indeed follow that all things come about by causes that precede 
them, but these are not perfect and primary causes, rather auxiliary and 
proximate ones. And if those themselves are not in our power, it does 
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not follow that impulse too is not in our power. This would follow, if we 
said that all things come about through perfect and primary causes, so 
that, since those causes are not in our power, impulse too would not be 
in our power [Fat. 41; trans. Sharples].
Chrysippus distinguishes between auxiliary/proximate causes and 
perfect/primary ones. As we shall see (below, p.15), perfect/primary causes 
by themselves suffice for the outcome, so that (as the sources remark: 
cf. Sextus, M IX 238 and 242; Clement, Strom. VIII 9 33.1) they are 
completely simultaneous with the result: the outcome ensues whenever, 
and only whenever, its perfect/primary cause is present.
The distinction is then applied to assumptions [1] and [2] of the 
argument. Assumption [1] deals with Fate insofar as it is conceived as 
a chain of preceding causes; therefore, it cannot be valid for perfect/
primary causes, only for non-perfect/primary ones. Assumption [2], on 
the other hand, does not necessarily deal with preceding causes; as we 
have seen (above, p.9), it is the opponent’s contention that it does, but that 
contention is now called into question by Chrysippus.
I take it is Chrysippus’ view that it cannot be the case that what it means 
for something to be up to us is for us to be its ultimate origin or first cause. 
For him, accepting that, together with assumption [3] in the argument 
(which is never called into question), would have the consequence that 
praise, blame, honor, and punishment can only be just if we, rather than 
anything else, are the authors of that for which we are praised, blamed, 
honored, or punished—presumably because only thus one may, say, inflict 
a (justified and legitimate) injury on another on account of an offense. In 
Stoic terms, however, that would amount to no more than paying back 
a (dispreferred) indifferent for another, and would therefore completely 
miss the point of what it is for punishments to be just.
Cicero paraphrases Chrysippus as claiming that it is a necessary 
condition for “impulse” itself to be in our power that the perfect/primary 
causes of “impulse” be in our power (“Since those causes are not in our 
power, impulse too would not be in our power,” cum eae causae non essent 
in nostra potestate, ne ille quidem esset in nostra potestate). In my view, that 
should be read not only as a statement to the effect that no antecedent 
causes of our “impulses” may be their perfect/primary causes if we are to 
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be responsible for them—as Bobzien (1998a: 255-8 and 1998b) reads it—
but also as a statement to the effect that we must be the perfect/primary 
causes of our “impulses” if we are to be responsible for them.
In effect, on the basis of the definition of τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (“that which is 
up to us”) as τὸ δι’ ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης γιγνόμενον (“that which is 
subsumed under Fate and takes place on our account”) in Alexander, Fat. 
13-4 (cf. the second hand in MS B [Marcianus gr. 261] at 181.14 with 
182.3-4, 7-8, 12-13, and 182.31-183.3) and Nemesius, Nat. Hom. 35, I 
surmise that Chrysippus reformulates assumption [2] in the argument as
[2*] If our nature is not x’s perfect/primary cause, then x is not up to us.
Hahm (1994) has convincingly shown that διά + gen. is used in Stoicism 
to refer to outcomes brought about through an item’s nature (including 
the nature of inanimate items such as a stone or, one may add, cylinders 
and cones). That, in turn, explains the use of the phrase in Clement, Strom. 
VIII 9 25.3 and 33.2, where the sustaining cause (συνεκτικὸν αἴτιον) is 
said to be synonymously called perfect in itself (αὐτοτελές) because it 
“self-sufficiently, on its own account produces its outcome” (αὐτάρκως 
δι’ αὑτοῦ ποιητικόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος): according to that, an item’s 
nature or sustaining cause may be said to bring about on its own account 
outcomes such as a stone’s falling down when released from a certain 
height. Since, in addition, such cause is synonymously called perfect in 
itself, the definiens in Alexander and Nemesius (“that which is subsumed 
under Fate and takes place on our account”) may be understood as “that 
which is subsumed under Fate and has our nature as the perfect/primary 
cause of its taking place”—which in turn entails [2*].
Bobzien (1998a: 359-70) argues that the definition in Alexander and 
Nemesius should be ascribed not to Chrysippus but only to Philopator 
(2nd century AD): while “the Stoics Chrysippus, Philopator, and many 
distinguished others” (τῶν Στοϊκῶν Χρύσιππός τε καὶ Φιλοπάτωρ καὶ ἄλλοι 
πολλοὶ καὶ λαμπροί) are mentioned in Nemesius, only Philopator’s book 
On Fate is alluded to in the immediate context from which the definition 
is extracted. But, as we have seen, Diogenianus’s report on Book II of 
Chrysippus’ work On Fate (apud Eusebius, Praep. Ev. VI 8) allows for the 
ascription of a remarkably parallel definition of τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς (“that which 
depends on us”) as τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης γιγνόμενον (“that which 
doispontos, Curitiba, São Carlos, vol. 10, n. 2, p.109-134, outubro, 2013
118
is subsumed under Fate and whose taking place proceeds from us”) to 
Chrysippus.7 That might point in the direction of a Chrysippean strategy 
of amending notions of the debate on Fate and moral responsibility so as 
to fit his own views, and would increase the likelihood of ascribing also to 
Chrysippus the definition reported by Alexander and Nemesius.
Matters being such, we are now faced with the issue of clarifying 
what it means for something to be a perfect/primary cause and how that 
relates to the issue of justice in praise, blame, honor, and punishment. Let 
us begin with the cylinder and cone analogy, presented in the sequence 
in Cicero’s text:
Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, 
facile a se explicari putat. Nam quamquam adsensio non possit fieri 
nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, 
non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam 
dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus 
excitata (necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri), sed revertitur 
ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa 
non possunt. Id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et 
cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat. “Ut igitur,” inquit, “qui 
protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem 
non dedit, sic visum obiectum inprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in 
animo suam speciem, sed adsensio nostra erit in potestate, eaque, quem 
ad modum in cylindro dictum est, extrinsecus pulsa, quod reliquum est, 
suapte vi et natura movebitur. Quodsi aliqua res efficeretur sine causa 
antecedente, falsum esset omnia fato fieri; sin omnibus, quaecumque 
fiunt, veri simile est causam antecedere, quid adferri poterit, cur non 
omnia fato fieri fatendum sit? modo intellegatur, quae sit causarum 
distinctio ac dissimilitudo.”
As for the statement that assentings come about through causes laid 
down beforehand, [Chrysippus] thinks that he can easily explain this. 
For although assenting could not occur unless aroused by a sense-
impression, nevertheless, since it has this sense-impression as proximate 
and not as primary cause it may be explained, as Chrysippus would 
have it, in the way that we described some time ago; not indeed that 
the assenting could occur without being aroused by any external 
force—for it is necessary that assenting should be caused by a 
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sense-impression—but he goes back to his cylinder and spinning-top; 
these cannot begin to move unless pushed, but, when this has happened, 
he thinks that for the rest it is by their own nature that the cylinder rolls 
and the top moves in a curve. “As therefore,” he says, “he who pushes a 
cylinder gives it the beginning of its motion, but does not give it roll-
ability; so a sense-impression when it strikes will, it is true, impress and 
as it were stamp its appearance on the mind, but assenting will be in our 
power, and, in the same way as was said in the case of the cylinder, it is 
pushed from outside but for the rest moves by its own force and nature. 
If something were to occur without an antecedent cause, it would not 
be true that everything occurred by fate; if however it seems likely that 
everything which happens is preceded by a cause, what reason can be 
adduced for not admitting that everything occurs by fate?—provided 
only that it is understood what is the distinction and difference among 
causes” [Fat. 42-3; trans. Sharples, slightly altered].
Bobzien (1998a: 258-71 and 1998b) criticizes what she calls “the standard 
interpretation” of the analogy—e.g., that of Frede (1980/1987)—for 
taking the second factor in the analogy (i.e., the nature of the cylinder, 
cone, or person) both as cooperating with the first factor (i.e., the push, 
or the impression) and as being a perfect/primary cause: in Stoic physics, 
a perfect/primary cause brings about its outcome wholly by itself, and 
does not cooperate with any other factor. Furthermore, a perfect/primary 
cause, being the same as a sustaining cause (see above, p.117, on Clement, 
Strom. VIII 9 25.3 and 33.2), is cause not of a movement but of a state 
of affairs in Stoic physics—whereas, she claims, the effect in the analogy 
is not a state of affairs but a movement. In her view, Chrysippus’ sole 
aim here is to show that the second, cooperating factor in the analogy is 
responsible for the outcome to the following extent: since two different 
items, a and b, respond differently to the same item c (correspondent to 
the first factor in the analogy), a and b are thus responsible for the (moral) 
quality of the effect, it therefore being up to each of them to respond thus or 
otherwise to c in the sense that each makes a different contribution to the 
outcome. Specifically,
Physically, the difference between individual natures of our minds are 
due to a difference in the tension (τόνος) of the mind-pneuma. In every 
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prospective case of assent, whether the incoming impression results in 
an act of assent to it will depend on the state of tension of that pneuma. 
Thus, the individual nature of the person’s mind is responsible for 
whether assent is given, as the shape of the pushed object is for whether 
it will roll … It is the faculty of assent which makes it possible for 
adult human beings to become the controlling factor of their actions, 
in that it enables them to respond to externally induced impressions in 
accordance with the individual nature of their mind. They are thus not 
forced in their decisions and actions (1998a: 268-9).
Nevertheless, how does that show that what a and b do is something 
for which a and b may justly be praised, blamed, honored, or punished? 
Absence of external compulsion is clearly not sufficient for such result, 
since it is not sufficient to establish that we, and not whatever determines 
our natures, are the authors of our decisions and actions.8 In my view, 
Bobzien is right in claiming that perfect/primary causes are non-
cooperative, but wrong in taking the second factor in the analogy as a 
cooperative, non-perfect/primary cause; instead, it should be seen as a 
non-cooperative, perfect/primary cause—which then explains, as we 
shall see, why Chrysippus thinks a person may justly be praised, blamed, 
honored, or punished.
Sextus, M IX 237-45 may illuminate a few points in the analogy. There, 
two schemes of causation are distinguished, one in which a cause is said 
to require an auxiliary (συνεργόν) in order to bring about its outcome, 
the other in which a cause is said to bring about its outcome “completely 
by itself, i.e. making use only of its own force” (αὐτοτελῶς καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ μόνον 
προσχρώμενον δυνάμει, 241), or “completely by itself, i.e. sufficiently by its 
own nature” (αὐτοτελῶς καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει ἀρκούμενον, 242). Although the 
latter passage does not attribute to Chrysippus the doctrine it reports, one 
is here reminded of the phrases used by Cicero to characterize the way 
the second factor brings about its outcome in the analogy, namely, suapte 
natura (“by its own nature,” 42) and suapte vi et natura (“by its own force 
and nature,” 43).
Cicero, Top. 58-61 also speaks about “causes which effect <their result> 
singly, with no auxiliary” (causae quae plane efficiant nulla re adiuvante), and 
offers wisdom (sapientia) as an example, since it “makes <the wise> wise 
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all by itself ” (sapientis efficit sola per se).9 According to the example, one’s 
mind thus and thus disposed (so as, say, to be wise) all by itself causes 
one to, say, be such as to assent to presentation x and refuse assent to 
presentation y.
One must notice that such cause is said to effect not one’s acting 
thus or otherwise but one’s being thus or otherwise—which of course 
includes one’s being such as to act thus or otherwise. The latter point may 
be appreciated also in the analogy, once one acknowledges that phrases 
such as quod superest in §42 and quod reliquum est in §43 (“for the rest”) 
may be explained away as a simple misreading of the prefix of a verb such 
as προσχρῶμαι (“to make use of ”), attested in Sextus. (Which, of course, 
is not to deny that προσχρῶμαι has the meaning “to use something in 
addition,” only to claim that in some cases, if the prefix is not simply 
otiose, the verb has instead the meaning “to use something in a given 
connection.” An example of the latter meaning may in fact be found in 
Sextus, M VIII 463-4, where it is said that the person who claims there is 
no demonstration does that either demonstrating her claim by way of an 
argument or “making use of a bare, undemonstrated assertion” (ψιλῇ καὶ 
ἀναποδείκτῳ χρώμενος φάσει, 463)—the latter option being reformulated 
in the sequence as “making use of a bare assertion in that connection” 
(ψιλῇ φάσει προσχρώμενος, 464), where it is clear that the meaning “to 
use [the bare assertion that there is no demonstration] in addition” is 
ruled out.) Thus, passages such as id autem cum accidit suapte natura quod 
superest et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat (§42), and extrinsecus 
pulsa quod reliquum est suapte vi et natura movebitur (§43) should be read, 
once quod superest and quod reliquum est are dropped, as “Chrysippus 
thinks that by their own nature the cylinder rolls-when-pushed and 
the cone spins-when-pushed,” and “by its own force and nature it 
will-move-when-pushed-from-outside.”
That according to Chrysippus one is (justly) praised, blamed, honored, 
or punished for the fact that one’s nature is the perfect/primary cause 
of an effect such as acting-thus-when-such-and-such-obtain may be 
gathered also from Galen, PHP IV 6, where Chrysippus is presented 
as having claimed (in the Ethics [=Book IV, or the Therapeutics] of his 
work On Affections) that, since the tension (τόνος) of a person’s mind may 
consist in a soft and weak state (ἀτονία, ἀσθένεια), or in a firm and strong 
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one (εὐτονία, ἰσχύς), there is a condition (κατάστασις) which is such as to 
assert itself (ἐπιτελεστική) and another which is such as to give in or yield 
(ἐνδοτική)—namely, to the passions. Galen continues:
εἶθ’ ἑξῆς ἐξηγούμενος αὐτὸ τοῦτο τάδε γράφει· «ὁ μὲν δειμῶν ἐπιγινομένων 
ἀφίσταται, ὁ δὲ κέρδους ἢ ζημίας φερομένης ἐξελύθη καὶ ἐνέδωκεν, ὁ δὲ 
καθ’ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα οὐκ ὀλίγα. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τρέπεταί τε καὶ 
δουλοῦται ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἐνδιδόντας αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλους καὶ πόλεις προδιδόναι 
καὶ αὑτοὺς εἰς πολλὰς καὶ ἀσχήμονας πράξεις ἐπιδιδόναι τῆς πρόσθεν 
φορᾶς ἐκλυθείσης. οἷος εἰσῆκται καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ ὁ Μενέλαος· σπασάμενος 
γὰρ τὴν μάχαιραν φέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλένην ὡς ἀναιρήσων, ἰδὼν δὲ καὶ 
καταπλαγεὶς [εἰς] τὸ κάλλος ἐξέβαλε τὴν μάχαιραν, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔτι 
δυνάμενος κρατεῖν, καθὰ καὶ ἡ ἐπίπληξις αὕτη εἴρηται αὐτῷ· 
σὺ δ’ ὡς ἐσεῖδες μαστὸν [ἐκείνης] ἐκβαλὼν ξίφος 
φίλημ’ ἐδέξω προδότιν αἰκάλλων κύνα.» 
He [=Chrysippus] then writes an explanation of this very statement: 
“One person desists when dangers arise, another yield and gave in when 
gain or loss were brought about, another upon encountering other such 
things, not few in number. Every such situation defeats and enslaves us, 
so that by yielding to it we betray friends and cities and offer ourselves 
up to many shameful acts after our former impetus has gone slack. 
Euripides has presented Menelaus as this kind of person. He drew his 
sword and rushed at Helen to kill her, but on seeing <her> and being 
struck by her beauty he let the sword drop, no longer able even to keep 
his hold on it. He was accordingly rebuked with these words [Andr. 
629-30]:
When you caught sight of her breast you dropped your sword
And took her kiss, fawning on the treacherous bitch” 
[PHP IV 6 7-9; trans. De Lacy, slightly altered].
The passage from Euripides is part of Peleus’ long rebuke of Menelaus 
when the latter is on the brink of killing Andromache and her son 
(vv.590-641). It opens (v.590: “You, a man?,” σὺ γὰρ μετ’ ἀνδρῶν;) and 
closes (v.641: “You are naught,” σὺ δ’ οὐδὲν εἶ) with a condemnation 
of Menelaus’ whole person. Menelaus is rebuked, among other things, 
also for being such that he even bid Agamemnon sacrifice Iphigenia 
doispontos, Curitiba, São Carlos, vol. 10, n. 2, p.109-134, outubro, 2013
123
(vv.624-5)—“such was your dread to lose your worthless wife,” οὕτως 
ἔδεισας μὴ οὐ κακὴν δάμαρτ’ ἔχῃς (v.626). Since in Stoic philosophy the 
tension in one’s mind-pneuma corresponds to one’s mind’s being thus 
and thus disposed (ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον) and that, in turn, to one’s (moral) 
nature, one may infer that Chrysippus read Peleus’ rebuke of Menelaus 
as aimed at Menelaus’ moral nature—in view, one may add, of correcting 
it (the aim of the Therapeutics being after all the cure of the passions), if 
only in so far as would allow Andromache and her son presently not to 
be killed.
III
What, however, is the point of all this? As we have seen in his reply to 
the objection reported by Diogenianus (apud Eusebius, Praep. Ev. VI 8), 
Chrysippus thinks that, even though everything takes place by Fate, praise 
and blame are still necessary in order to effect a change in one’s ways; 
now, faced with the objection that praise and blame, as well as honor and 
punishment, are not just if everything takes place by Fate, Chrysippus 
provides in his reply an account of “that which is up to us” in terms 
of self-sufficient causation (“that which has our nature as its perfect/
primary cause”) which does not square with a conception of justice in 
retributive terms, as the objection has it, but is tailored to suit one in 
rehabilitative terms: praise and blame, as well as honor and punishment, 
are only apposite if the person stands in need of amendment—which, in 
turn, is in the very least compatible with (if it does not imply) her being 
of such nature as to act in certain ways in given circumstances.
The claim that punishment is to be understood as corrective in 
character in the lines sketched above may also underlie the following 
passage from Plutarch, St. Rep. 15:
Ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα περὶ Δικαιοσύνης εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
ἐνάλλεται τῷ περὶ θεῶν λόγῳ καί φησιν οὔτ’ ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ 
ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν Κέφαλον, εὐδιάβλητόν τ’ εἶναι καὶ 
πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐξάγ<ειν παρέχ>οντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ 
πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, 
ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς, δι’ ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ 
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κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσιν. οὕτω δὲ διασύρας τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος 
ἐπαινεῖ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ προφέρεται τὰ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ταυτὶ πολλάκις· 
ἀλλ’ ἔστιν, κεἴ τις ἐγγελᾷ λόγῳ, 
Ζεὺς καὶ θεοὶ βρότεια λεύσσοντες πάθη· 
καὶ ὁμοίως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης τὰ Ἡσιόδεια ταυτὶ 
προενεγκάμενος 
τοῖσιν δ’ οὐρανόθεν μέγ’ ἐπήλασε πῆμα Κρονίων, 
λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν· ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί 
ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅπως τῶν πονηρῶν κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ 
παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν. 
At the very beginning of the books concerning Justice directed 
against Plato himself he pounces upon the argument about the gods 
and says that Cephalus was wrong in trying to make fear of the gods 
a deterrent from injustice [Rep. I 330d-331b] and that the argument 
about divine chastisements is easily discredited and, <as it produces> 
many distractions and conflicting plausibilities, is an inducement in 
the opposite direction, being in fact no different from the Bogy and 
Hobgoblin with which women try to keep little children from mischief. 
Yet, having thus disparaged Plato’s words, in other places again he praises 
and frequently quotes these lines of Euripides [fr. 991],
   In fact there are, though one deride the words,
   Zeus and the gods, who mark our mortal woes;
and similarly in the first book concerning Justice he quotes these verses 
of Hesiod [Op. 242],
   Zeus from the heavens inflicted a grievous calamity on them,
   Plague and famine at once; and the populace utterly perished,
and then says that the gods do these things in order that from the 
chastisement of the wicked the rest avail themselves of these examples 
and attempt less such misdeeds [1040A-C; trans. Cherniss, slightly 
altered].
It must be noticed that “deterrence” and “example” in Plutarch’s report 
are (at least potentially) misleading. As for “deterrence,” Cephalus says 
(in Plato, Rep. I 330d) that “he is to pay the penalty there [=in Hades] 
who committed injustice here,” τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην. 
In light of 331a-b, where Cephalus claims that the possession of wealth 
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allows one to fulfill one’s duties and thus avoid departing to Hades in fear, 
punishment is there to be taken in the very least as including a retributive 
element, on the grounds that in Hades one will get what one deserves. 
In my view, Chrysippus’ main focus is in effect on that element: when 
Chrysippus claims that “the argument about divine chastisements is easily 
discredited” (εὐδιάβλητον … εἶναι … τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων 
λόγον) I think he is objecting precisely to Cephalus’ notion of punishment 
as payback (the gods cannot be such that they exact penalties from the 
mortals in those terms, and therefore the stories about Hades are but 
old wives’ tales), whereas when he claims that that argument “produces 
many distractions and conflicting plausibilities” (πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐξάγ<ειν 
παρέχ>οντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας) he 
has in mind other issues in the passage such as are raised by Cephalus’ 
assumptions that one may be guilty of failing to perform one’s duties even 
when one is unable to perform them (e.g., when in poverty), and that 
behavior motivated by mere fear of the gods may be sufficient for one to 
escape divine punishment (as if the gods did not care about one’s virtue 
or vice). As for “example,” on the other hand, Hesiod speaks in vv.238-
47 about punishment inflicted by Zeus on a mass of people (on account 
of the transgression of but one), in such a way that punishment cannot 
be exemplary in the passage (since the whole population is subjected to 
it). In view of the fact that one is here dealing with the justice of Zeus, 
Chrysippus’ claim must be that everyone who is subjected to punishment 
by the father of the gods (who, in Stoic terms, is identical to Providence) 
stands in fact in need of correction (supposedly, for not being a Stoic 
sage), the one possessed of an overtly wicked nature (v.241: “he who 
transgresses and devises reckless deeds,” ὅστις ἀλιτραίνει καὶ ἀτάσθαλα 
μηχανάαται) as well as the rest—who, one is to assume, are seen by Zeus 
as prone to become such as the other is (since it is implied in the report 
that they will in due course attempt such misdeeds if not chastised, some 
of them even if chastised: “in order that … the rest … attempt less such 
misdeeds,” ὅπως … οἱ λοιποὶ … ἧττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν)—albeit, of 
course, punishment and other such therapeutic measures should no more 
than fit the needs of each person. While a difference between human and 
divine assessment of one’s moral character and dispositions should be 
stressed (Peleus [see above, pp.19-20] can only appraise Menelaus’ nature 
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via an assessment of his past deeds, while Zeus knows from the outset 
whatever one may be up to) the upshot is that, regarding the issue of 
justice in punishments, for Chrysippus it is only relevant whither one’s 
nature leans one (being the perfect/primary cause of one’s inclinations 
and disinclinations), regardless even of prior offense.10 
IV
In conclusion, two further passages should be taken into account:
(i) Cicero, Fat. 7-11
The above understanding of what it means for something to be up 
to us (according to which it is immaterial whether one’s nature is but 
the result of preceding causes, since one’s being of such and such nature 
suffices for one to stand in need of such and such correction) may be 
adumbrated in the following passage from Cicero’s De Fato:
Non enim, si alii ad alia propensiores sunt propter causas naturalis et 
antecedentis, idcirco etiam nostrarum voluntatum atque adpetitionum 
sunt causae naturales et antecedentes. Nam nihil esset in nostra potestate, 
si ita se res haberet. Nunc vero fatemur, acuti hebetesne, valentes 
inbecilline simus, non esse id in nobis … Ut enim et ingeniosi et tardi 
ita nascantur antecedentibus causis itemque valentes et inbecilli, non 
sequitur tamen, ut etiam sedere eos et ambulare et rem agere aliquam 
principalibus causis definitum et constitutum sit.
It is not the case that, if different people are more inclined to different 
things because of natural antecedent causes, there are also for that reason 
natural and antecedent causes of our wills and desires. For if that were 
how the matter stood, nothing would be in our power. As it is, however, 
we assert that it is not up to us whether we are sharp or dull-witted, 
strong or weak … Granted that the talented and the slow are born like 
that from antecedent causes, and similarly the strong and the weak, still 
it does not follow that their sitting and walking and doing anything 
is also defined and decided by primary causes [Fat. 9; trans. Sharples, 
slightly altered].
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Cicero here asserts in propria persona that nothing can be up to us if there 
are antecedent causes of our wills and desires. His own view, as I take it, 
is that although there are antecedent causes of our dispositions (and our 
dispositions are thus not up to us) the antecedent causes of our dispositions 
are not the antecedent causes of our having this or other will and desire 
(it being therefore open for us to will and desire thus or otherwise in 
the circumstances, as the examples of Stilpo and Socrates overcoming 
their respective natures illustrate in the sequence: cf. §10). The view 
he criticizes (i.e., Chrysippus’ view: cf. §7) asserts that there are indeed 
antecedent causes of our dispositions, and that our dispositions are, in turn, 
the perfect/primary causes of our having this and not other will and desire in the 
circumstances11 (which, one is to assume, is nevertheless up to us, according 
to this view)—in such a way that, we may finally see, Chrysippus’ reply 
to the objection in §40 is apt to counter not only an argument framed 
in terms of preceding causes understood as factors which induce one’s 
“impulses” (as the push, and also both visum (§42) and visum obiectum 
(§43) may seem to imply in the analogy) but also an argument framed in 
terms of preceding causes understood as factors which shape one’s nature.
(ii) Gellius, NA VII 212 
The account offered above is compatible with (even if not directly 
derivable from) Gellius, NA VII 213. There, an objection is advanced against 
Chrysippus’ theory of Fate which relies upon the thesis that if everything 
takes place by Fate our actions are not to be attributed to us (presumably 
because they would not be authored by us), which would in turn render 
punishment (and even indignation) unfair (§5). Chrysippus’ reply (§§7-10) 
consists in grounding fair penalty on the fact that one is to act thus rather 
than otherwise in the circumstances, while the fact that one’s nature has 
been fashioned thus rather than otherwise by preceding causes in the form 
of nature or even education is not even taken into account.14 
There follows the analogy of the cylinder (§11), in which the “state”15 
or “disposition” (Latin ita … habet, presumably reminiscent of Greek πὼς 
ἔχον) of an item’s “mind” or “shape” (the item’s πνεῦμα, or the relevant 
part thereof) accounts for, and therefore grounds one’s control over, the 
outcome in the circumstances: because of the disposition of its shape 
the cylinder “thereupon [i.e., upon being thrown over a slope] rolls 
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downwards,” mox … praeceps voluitur. Gellius then quotes and paraphrases 
what appears to be Chrysippus’ conclusion (§§12-14):
Infert deinde verba haec, his quae dixi congruentia:
Διὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων εἴρηται·
γνώσει δ᾿ ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πήματ᾿ ἔχοντας,
ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἑκάστοις παρ᾿ αὐτοὺς16 γινομένων καὶ καθ᾿ ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν 
ἁμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ 
<διά>θεσιν.17 
Propterea negat oportere ferri audique homines aut nequam aut ignavos 
et nocentes et audaces, qui, cum in culpa et maleficio revincti sunt, 
perfugiunt ad fati necessitatem, tamquam in aliquod fani asylum et, 
quae pessime fecerunt, ea non suae temeritate, sed fato esse attribuenda 
dicunt. Primus autem hoc sapientissimus ille et antiquissimus poetarum 
dixit hisce versibus,
ὦ πόποι, οἷον δή νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται.
ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ᾿ ἔμμεναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε᾿ ἔχουσι.
Then he [=Chrysippus] adduces the following words, which are 
congruous with what I just said:
“Therefore it is said by the Pythagoreans,
   You will learn that men’s penalties are self-chosen,
much to the effect that each one’s harms depend on one to take place, 
and that it is according to one’s impulse that one errs and is harmed, as 
well as according to one’s mind and state.”
For this reason he denies that one should endure, and listen to, men 
who are either worthless, idle, harmful, or rash, who, when bound fast 
in crime and evildoing, seek refuge in the necessity of Fate as in the 
asylum of a shrine and say that their wicked actions are to be attributed 
not to their recklessness but to Fate. But the first to say this was the 
wisest and oldest of the poets in these verses [α 32-4], 
   Oh for shame, how the mortals accuse us gods,
   for they say evils come from us, when it is they, rather,
   who by their own recklessness win sorrow beyond what is due!
The use of παρά + acc. and of α 32-4 has a close parallel in Diogenianus’ 
report (cf. Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8 2)—which points in the direction of a 
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continuity between Diogenianus’ and Gellius’ respective reports (see above, 
pp.109-111, 117-118). Also, it is capital to appreciate the role played by 
Golden Verse 54 on “self-chosen penalties” (αὐθαίρετα πήματα) and by α 34 
on men who “by their own recklessness win sorrow beyond what is due” 
(σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε᾿ ἔχουσι): since one’s “self-inflicted 
penalties” appear to be the harm (cf. τῶν βλαβῶν and βλαπτομένων in §12) 
one causes oneself in doing wrong, and since the use of α 34 implies such 
harm is undeserved (cf. ὑπὲρ μόρον, “beyond what is due”), the thesis 
asserted by Chrysippus in the passage appears to be that one is harmed 
(or rather harms oneself) beyond desert when one does wrong—a thesis 
which is attributed to him in the following testimony:
Aὖθις ἐν ταῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης Ἀποδείξεσιν ἀδικεῖσθαί φησιν ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ 
τὸν ἀδικοῦντα καὶ αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν, ὅταν ἄλλον ἀδικῇ, γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ τοῦ 
παρανομεῖν αἴτιον καὶ βλάπτοντα παρ’ ἀξίαν ἑαυτόν.
Later in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he [=Chrysippus] says the 
wrongdoer is wronged by herself and wrongs herself whenever she 
wrongs another, for she has become a cause of transgression for herself 
and is harming herself beyond desert [Plutarch, St. Rep. 16 1041C; trans. 
Cherniss, slightly altered].
If one also bears in mind that (according to Aristotle, EE IV/EN V 
1132b15-17) the Pythagoreans define justice (τὸ δίκαιον) as reciprocity 
(τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός),18 and that Golden Verse 58 says that men “are drawn 
from one place to the other like cylinders, with limitless penalties” (ὡς … 
κύλινδροι ἄλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλα φέρονται ἀπείρονα πήματ’ ἔχοντας),19 Chrysippus 
appears to derive from his reply to the objection concerning justice in 
honor and punishments an amendment to Pythagorean doctrine: to harm 
oneself “according to one’s own mind and state” (κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν 
καὶ <διά>θεσιν, respectively identical to one’s ἡγεμονικόν [cf. Stobaeus, Flor. 
II 65,2-3; Plutarch, VM 3 441c] and to the stable state or disposition 
of one’s ἡγεμονικόν, here correspondent to one’s virtue or vice) is in 
effect to have evil inflicted by oneself upon oneself through one’s own 
perversity—but, contrary to Pythagorean thought, that cannot even be 
just, much less what justice is: since being vicious and doing wrong are 
(the only) evil, while being wronged is a mere dispreferred indifferent, 
no commensurability is possible between the two; moreover, since one 
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is said by the Pythagoreans to be drawn like a cylinder in being vicious 
and doing wrong (which, in light of Chrysippus’ cylinder analogy, is to be 
understood as a claim to the effect that being vicious and doing wrong 
is but one’s nature), one cannot be said to be the ultimate origin of one’s 
dispositions—and therefore, since the only evils are the ones suffered by 
the wrongdoers themselves (who accordingly stand in need of correction 
for being such), justice cannot but consist, as suggested, in making use of 
whichever means are apposite in order to mend one’s ways.
Appendix
Gellius, NA VII 2 5-11
[5] “Si Chrysippus,” inquiunt, “fato putat omnia moueri et regi nec 
declinari transcendique posse agmina fati et uolumina, peccata quoque 
hominum et delicta non suscensenda neque inducenda sunt ipsis 
uoluntatibusque eorum, sed necessitati cuidam et instantiae, quae oritur 
ex fato,” omnium quae sit rerum domina et arbitra, per quam necesse sit 
fieri, quicquid futurum est; et propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique 
constitutas, si homines ad maleficia non sponte ueniunt, sed fato trahuntur. 
[6] Contra ea Chrysippus tenuiter multa et argute disserit; sed omnium 
fere, quae super ea re scripsit, huiuscemodi sententia est. [7] “Quamquam 
ita sit,” inquit, “ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali coacta atque 
conexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum proinde 
sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. [8] Nam si sunt 
per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam uim, quae 
de fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensius tractabiliusque transmittunt. Sin 
uero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis 
fulta, etiamsi paruo siue nullo fatalis incommodi conflictu urgeantur, sua 
tamen scaeuitate et uoluntario impetu in assidua delicta et in errores se 
ruunt. [9] Idque ipsum ut ea ratione fiat, naturalis illa et necessaria rerum 
consequentia efficit, quae fatum uocatur. [10] Est enim genere ipso quasi 
fatale et consequens, ut mala ingenia peccatis et erroribus non uacent.” 
[11] Huius deinde fere rei exemplo non hercle nimis alieno neque 
inlepido utitur. “Sicut,” inquit, “lapidem cylindrum si per spatia terrae 
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prona atque derupta iacias, causam quidem ei et initium praecipitantiae 
feceris, mox tamen ille praeceps uoluitur, non quia tu id iam facis, sed 
quoniam ita sese modus eius et formae uolubilitas habet: sic ordo et ratio 
et necessitas fati genera ipsa et principia causarum mouet, impetus uero 
consiliorum mentiumque nostrarum actionesque ipsas uoluntas cuiusque 
propria et animorum ingenia moderantur.”
[5] “If Chrysippus,” they say, “believes that all things are moved and ruled 
by Fate, and that the paths and coils of Fate cannot be bent or transgressed, 
then the sins and faults of men, too, should not cause indignation, nor be 
attributed to themselves and their wills but to a certain necessity and 
urgency which arises from Fate,” which is the mistress and arbiter of all 
things, <and> through which it is necessary that everything take place 
which will take place; and therefore the penalties for criminals have been 
unfairly established by law, if men do not come to evil voluntarily, but 
are dragged by Fate. [6] Against this Chrysippus says many things subtly 
and acutely, but the meaning of almost everything he wrote on the topic 
is of the following kind. [7] “Although it is true,” he says, “that all things 
are united and connected by a necessary and primary reason which is 
Fate, yet the states of our minds are themselves subject to Fate to the 
extent that this is their characteristic quality. [8] For if they have been 
fashioned in a healthy and beneficial manner by nature, they will transmit 
in a most inoffensive and tractable manner all that force which falls upon 
them from without on account of Fate. But if they are rough, ignorant, 
rude, and without any support from education, then, even if they are 
urged by the strike of slight or null fated inconvenience, by their own 
perversity and voluntary impulse they plunge into continuous faults and 
mistakes. [9] And that this much should take place in this way is due to 
that natural and necessary arrangement of things which is called Fate. [10] 
For it is by the type itself fated, so to speak, and arranged that evil states 
should not be without sins and mistakes.” [11] He then uses an illustration 
of approximately this point which, by Hercules!, is not altogether alien 
or lacking in wit. “As,” he says, “if you throw a cylindrical stone over a 
sloping, steep piece of ground, you will indeed have made for the cause 
and the onset of its tumbling down, yet it thereupon rolls downwards, 
this time not because you make it so, but because such is the disposition 
of its shape and the roll-ability of its form; just so the order, reason, and 
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necessity of Fate sets in motion the types themselves and the beginnings 
of causes, but the impulses of our designs and thoughts, and our actions 
themselves, are regulated by our own will and the states of our minds.”
1 I would like to thank everyone with whom I discussed a previous version of this paper in 
April 2013 at a meeting of the Projeto Temático FAPESP “Filosofia Grega Clássica” (directed 
by Marco Zingano) at the University of São Paulo, especially David Sedley (Christ’s College, 
Cambridge).
2 The following paragraphs sum up and develop a few points from my “Is Diogenianus (apud 
Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8) a Source for Chrysippus’ Reply to the Idle Argument?” Dissertatio 36 
(2012): 343-64.
3 Bobzien (1998a: 283-5) points out what she terms a “one-sided, causative concept of depen-
dency” in παρ’ ἡμᾶς γίνεσθαι and suggests “to happen because of us” as a translation.
4 As O’Keefe (2005) points out. Whether Epicurus intended such reading is, however, a ques-
tion I remain silent about. See Sedley (1983); Bobzien (2000 and 2006).
5 Which entails causal transitivity: “And if ‘impulses’ do [have an antecedent cause], so too 
do those things which follow on ‘impulse,’ and therefore so too do assents,” et, si adpetitus, illa 
etiam, quae adpetitum sequuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones—presumably, if “impulse” has an antece-
dent cause, then that which has “impulse” as its antecedent cause (namely, assent) has itself the 
antecedent cause of “impulse” as its antecedent cause.
6 The argument has the following form: ((A⊃B).(B⊃C).(C⊃D).~D)⊃~A. (One may also think of 
substituting Chrysippean (strict) implication for Philonian (material) implication.)
7 See my “Is Diogenianus …,” p.357 n.9.
8 As Bobzien herself (1998a: 290-301) acknowledges.
9 The example is the same as the one attributed to Zeno in Arius Didymus, Epit. Phys. fr. 18 
Diels = Stobaeus, Flor. I 13 138,14-22 (LS 55A), where it is said that φρόνησις (“wisdom”) is 
the cause of τὸ φρονεῖν (“being wise”), and that it is impossible that the cause be present and 
that of which it is the cause not be the case. Such being Zeno’s notion of a cause (i.e., what is 
later termed a perfect cause), it is perfectly acceptable that in Cicero the perfect cause should 
be called primary (i.e., a cause in the primary sense).
10 Gellius, NA XIV 4 relates that philosophers of more delicate doctrines (delicatiorum quidam 
disciplinarum philosophi) found Chrysippus’ praise of Justice (uerba ipsa Chrysippi de Iustitia scrip-
ta) in Book I of his work On the Fine and Pleasure to be the image not of Justice but of Cruelty 
(Saeuitiae imaginem istam esse, non Iustitiae).
11 Here I depart from, e.g., Sedley (1993), according to whom the passage attributes to 
Chrysippus the view that the antecedent causes of our dispositions are the primary causes of 
our wills and desires.
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12 The following paragraphs should correct the excesses in my “Is Diogenianus …,” pp.360-3.
13 Text and translation of Gellius, NA VII 2 5-11 may be found in the Appendix.
14 “The strike of slight or null fated inconvenience” (paruus sive nullus fatalis incommodi con-
flictus, §8) evidently points to factors which induce one’s presentations; “all that force which 
falls upon them from without on account of Fate” (omnis illa vis quae de fato extrinsecus ingruit, 
ibid.) may refer either to factors which induce one’s presentations or to factors which shape 
one’s nature.
15 Bobzien (1998a: 251n.36) proposes Greek διάθεσις behind Latin ingenium.
16 Following Hertz-Hosius (1903), who print αὐτοὺς (MS U [Urbinas 309]), not αὐτοῖς—the 
latter probably being a contamination from ἑκάστοις.
17 Usener’s conjecture.
18 Following Jackson (1879), ad loc.
19 Possibly, the source of Chrysippus’ cylinder a analogy.
Bibliography
BOBZIEN, S. 1998a. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. 
Oxford.
___. 1998b. Chrysippus’ Theory of Causes, in: IERODIAKONOU, K. 
(ed.) Topics in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford, pp.196-242.
___. 2000. Did Epicurus Discover the Free Will Problem? Oxford Studies 
in Ancient Philosophy 19, 287-338.
___. 2006. Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ 
Philosophy, in: REIS, B. (ed.) The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. 
Cambridge, pp.206-29.
CHERNISS, H. 1976. Plutarch: Moralia, vol. XIII. 2 parts. Cambridge, 
Mass.
De LACY, P.H. 2005. Galen: On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. First 
Part: Books I-V. 3rd ed. Berlin.
DIELS, H.1879. Doxographi Graeci. Berlin.
FREDE, M. 1980. The Original Notion of Cause, in: SCHOFIELD, M.; 
doispontos, Curitiba, São Carlos, vol. 10, n. 2, p.109-134, outubro, 2013
134
BURNYEAT, M.F.; BARNES, J. (eds.) Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in 
Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford, pp.217-49. (Reprinted in: FREDE, M. 
1987. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Minneapolis, pp.125-50.)
HAHM, D.E. 1994. Self-Motion in Stoic Philosophy, in: GILL, M.-L. 
& LENNOX, J.G. (eds.) Self-Motion: From Aristotle to Newton. Princeton, 
1994, pp.175-225.
HERTZ, M.J. & HOSIUS, C. 1903. A. Gellii Noctium Atticarum Libri XX. 
2 vols. Leipzig.
JACKSON, H. 1879. The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. 
Cambridge.
LAURSEN, S. 1995. The Early Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book, 
Cronache Ercolanesi 25, pp. 5-109.
___. 1997. The Later Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book, Cronache 
Ercolanesi 27, pp. 5-82.
LONG, A.A. & SEDLEY, D.N. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 vols. 
Cambridge.
O’KEEFE, T. 2005. Epicurus on Freedom. Cambridge.
SEDLEY, D.N. 1983. Epicurus’ Refutation of Determinism, in: VV.AA. 
ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ: Studi sull’ epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante, 
vol. I. Napoli, pp.11-51.
___. 1993. Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality, in: 
BRUNSCHWIG, J. & NUSSBAUM, M.C. (eds.) Passions and 
Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge 
pp.313-31.
SHARPLES, R.W. 1991. Cicero: On Fate & Boethius: The Consolation of 
Philosophy IV.5-7, V. Warminster.
WACHSMUTH, K. & HENSE, O. 1884-1923. Ioannis Stobaei 
Anthologium. 5 vols. with an appendix. Weidmann.
doispontos, Curitiba, São Carlos, vol. 10, n. 2, p.109-134, outubro, 2013
